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Abstract 
This study seeks to examine the relationship between Corporate Governance mechanisms and corporate web-
based investor relations reporting practices of companies listed in Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange (ADX). The study 
draws a sample of 56 companies listed in ADX and conducted a content analysis on their websites to assess the 
level to which investor relations information are disclosed. Results of the content analysis showed that all 
companies included in the sample have a corporate websites and more than 50% disclose information related to 
investor relations. A multivariate regression analysis was conducted to find the relationship between 4 
independent variables reflecting corporate governance mechanisms (Government ownership, Institutional 
ownership, Board independence, and Audit committee financial expertise) and Web-based investor relations 
disclosures. The results showed a significant positive relationship between Ownership structure (Government 
and Institutional) and Audit committee financial expertise and the degree to which companies disclose IR 
information on their websites. This indicates that strong corporate governance mechanisms are influencing and 
motivating companies to enhance and improve their disclosure activities by using a new medium (i.e. the internet) 
and therefore increasing the transparency and information availability to the stock market participants in 
emerging economies such as the UAE. 
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1. Introduction 
As a key ingredient of companies’ overall strategic management responsibility, investor relations (IR) has been 
considered as the link between a company and the financial community and other constituencies to reach a fair 
valuation of company’s share price (Marston and Straker, 2001).   Nowadays, one of the techniques used by IR 
to communicate with interested parties is to utilize company’s website for IR activities. Features of the internet 
(i.e. timeliness and reaching more people with less cost) made IR to perform in a more efficient and effective 
way (Kuperman, 2000).  Moreover, and based on the fact that anyone (in general) can access company’s website,  
the use of corporate websites in IR activities will not only increase the awareness of current and potential 
investors regarding companies’ performance and activities, it will also increase transparency and public 
awareness.  The use of corporate web sites to disseminate Investor relations information has been considered in 
prior literature as part of corporate voluntary disclosures activities. Accordingly, explaining corporate web-based 
investor relations practices relied on the agency theory as well as the institutional theory. (See for example; 
Pirchegger and Wagenhofer,1999; Geerings et. al. ,2003; Oyerlere et al., 2003; Marston and Polei, 2004; Xiao et 
al., 2004; Chan and Wickramasinghe, 2006; Bollen et al., 2006; Bonson and Escobar, 2006; Abdelsalam et al., 
2007; Kelton and Yang , 2008).  
Stemming from an agency theory perspective, corporate governance mechanisms are believed to have positive 
impact to mitigate the agency problem. Corporate governance might be viewed as the relationship between a 
company’s management and shareholders. It is defined as “the system by which business corporations are 
directed and controlled” (Rankin, et al.2012: 188). It is widely believed that the implementation of a good 
corporate governance framework presents companies a structured path to better management practices, effective 
oversight and control mechanisms which lead to opportunities for growth, financing and improved performance 
(Solomon, 2010). In this regard, countries with newly established, yet promising, financial markets such as the 
UAE consider the adoption of corporate governance code as a must in order to build up investors’ confidence in 
the financial market and to attract and sustain investments. This is believed to be achieved through increased 
disclosures and transparency of the financial market. As a result, the implementation of corporate governance 
code is seen by the UAE government as a priority when enhancing its financial markets.  
This study seeks to examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and web-based 
corporate investor relations practices of companies listed in Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange.  
 
2. Corporate governance regime in the UAE 
The economy of the United Arab Emirates is the second largest in the Arab world (after Saudi Arabia), with a 
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gross domestic product(GDP) of $377 billion (AED1.38 trillion) in 2012. Since the independence in 1971, 
UAE's economy has grown by nearly 231 times to AED1.45 trillion in 2013 (John, 2013). Although The United 
Arab Emirates is considered as one of the largest exports of Oil and Gas in the world, the general trend and 
vision in the UAE economy is to reduce its dependency on oil exports by diversifying the economy, particularly 
in the financial, tourism and construction sectors. This has been reflected by the founding father of the UAE the 
Late Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan: 
"We must not rely on oil alone as the main source of our national income. We have to diversify the sources of 
our revenue and construct economic projects that will ensure a free, stable and dignified life for the people” 
As a response, the UAE which is seeking to enhance its economic competitiveness by diversifying its resources 
and by building a knowledge-based economy has taken crucial steps in making the country to be viewed as an 
attractive environment for investments. One of these steps is to strengthen its financial market through ensuring 
that the investing environment in the UAE is safe, stable, protected by the law, and transparent. One of these 
steps is related to the implementation of a corporate governance code on companies listed in the UAE financial 
markets.     
Corporate Governance has been regulated in the UAE through a number of years by the UAE Securities and 
Commodities Authority (SCA). In early 2007, the SCA introduced the UAE code of corporate governance (SCA 
Decision R/32 of 2007). The code detailed the corporate governance requirements that companies should comply 
with. According to the code, listed companies are required to include in their annual reports a “corporate 
governance report” which should contain information about Board Structure and Directors duties and liabilities. 
Also, the corporate governance report should outline information about board committees, Directors’ 
remuneration, internal control, risk management, and the external auditor. In October 2009, a new code 
concerning Corporate Governance was issued by the UAE Ministry of Economy which amended the old code. 
The ministerial resolution No. 518 of 2009 refined, clarified, and updated the old code and made it clear that 
corporate governance disclosures are mandatory  on companies listed in the UAE securities market. In this 
regard, Companies listed in the UAE securities market were given a grace period of three years starting from 
2007 to comply with the code (no later than 30 April 2010).  
The new code places more emphasis on oversight of the management and functions of the board of directors by 
appointing more independent members and non-executive directors, forming committees and having external 
auditor who is neutral and independent to companies activities. Going beyond what is required by the previous 
Code, the External auditor is prohibited to perform any technical, administrative or consultation services or any 
services that may affect its independence. The duties of directors have been further enhanced in accordance with 
international standards. According to the code, the position of chairman of the board of directors and managing 
director should not be held by the same person different individuals. Also, the existence of non-executive 
directors has been increased and as a requirement, the board of any company should at least setup an audit 
committee, a nomination committee and remuneration committee. Both the audit, nomination and remuneration 
committees must comprise of not less than three non-executive directors, of whom at least two members shall be 
independent members and shall be chaired by either independent members. In this regard, these committees are 
entitled to submit written reports to ensure greater transparency of the procedures, results and recommendations 
that the committee reaches.  
In Addition, the new code also requires listed companies to have a code of conduct along with other corporate 
internal policies and standards. It requires the board of directors to establish a specific internal control system, to 
assess risk management and ensure a thorough execution of the governance rules. Most importantly, the new 
code also requires listed companies to apply environmental and social policies requiring greater corporate social 
responsibility. 
 
3. The use of corporate websites as investor relations tool  
The increase use of corporate websites as a new medium for communicating IR information has been clearly 
noticeable in recent years in a way that made many commentators predict a gradual disappearance of printed 
annual report (Beattie and Pratt, 2003). This “change” in the reporting mechanism has been predicted by Elliot 
(1992) when he noted that: 
“Information technology (IT) is changing everything. It represents a new, post-industrial paradigm of wealth 
creation that is replacing the industrial paradigm and is profoundly changing the way business is done….. If the 
purpose of accounting information is to support business decision making, and management’s decisions types 
are changing, then it is natural to expect accounting to change- both internal and external” 
The growing attention given by companies to the internet as a new medium for establishing communication with 
stakeholders has been attributed to the features that the internet can offer as a communication tool. It is believed 
that the attributes and advantages offered by the internet can be seen by both companies and stakeholders. Not 
least for companies, it can help to reduce costs. In addition, companies can both broaden and segment their 
disclosure audience, enhance disclosure timeliness, and improve communication quality by establishing a two 
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way communication dialogue with stakeholders as well as using features not available in the annual reports such 
as audio and video presentations (see for example: Ashbuagh et al., 1999; IASC, 1999; Deller et al., 1999; 
Beattie and Pratt, 2003).  
The internet offers easy access to firm’s financial information. Firms can use this technology to reach more 
potential users than they can by other communication means. Placing financial disclosures on the internet offers 
equal access to all users and reduces the information advantages of some institutional investors relative to others 
(Wagenhofer, 2003). In addition, the potential advantages for users lie in the ease of access and ease of search 
(Beattie and Pratt, 2003). Sophisticated, user friendly software agents provide the user with effective decision-
support facilities. Information can be made available more quickly, potentially on a real time basis. 
Also, corporate websites have been viewed as a tool for impression management. It is argued that websites could 
be used as an electronic window dressing that influence stakeholders’ impressions of firms’ legitimacy, 
innovation and caring (Winter et al, 2003) as well as Image creation through posting mission statements (Bart, 
2001). However, the freedom of publishing information on the company’s website could be abused and 
misleading. Any organization can look as good or bad as any other. This flexibility offers firms’ executives the 
power of web-based impression management to affect their companies’ images among their stakeholders, and to 
develop a strong identity (Winter et al, 2003).    
However, recognizing the vast potentials and advantages that the internet may provide for business 
communication does not imply that this phenomenon is flawless. Concerns regarding the credibility and integrity 
of publishing share price sensitive information on the company’s website without proper monitoring system have 
been raised by many scholars (see for example Debereceny and Gray, 1999; Hodge, 2001; and Lymer and 
Debereceny, 2003). The issue regarding hyper-linking audited financial statements to unaudited websites has 
been viewed as the main drawback of using the internet in business reporting (FASB, 2000). Moreover, another 
disadvantage of using the internet in business reporting is the possibility of issuing false information that could 
mislead investors. In this regard the FASB (2000; 23) noted that:  “…the internet generates more opportunity for 
rumors and disinformation to be circulated...” 
Nevertheless, and taking under consideration the unique attributes that the internet may offer to the activities 
done by IR, the presence of the internet, based on Kuperman (2000), did not changed the set of customers IR 
addresses or the type of information transmitted to these audiences. However, the introduction of the internet has 
provided the company’s management with new techniques to reach and communicate with its financial 
community. 
3.1. Prior studies  
In general, studies carried out in the accounting literature to examine the determinants of companies’ online 
reporting practices were quantitative in nature. Most of these studies relied mainly on the propositions provided 
by agency, signaling, and cost benefit theories. This theoretical perspective was a result of considering this issue 
as part of a company’s overall voluntary disclosure strategy. The primary theoretical foundation of these studies 
was the notion of information asymmetry between management and ownership (Debreceny et al, 2002). 
According to this view, corporations adopt new mechanisms to mitigate the adverse effects of information 
asymmetry.  In this regard, Marston and Polei (2004: 293) argued that:  
“… it can be assumed that these theories (Agency, signaling, and cost and benefit theories) explain information 
disclosure via corporate websites…”  
Based on this perspective, explanatory studies in the accounting literature focused on corporate characteristics 
such as size, profitability, leverage, age, growth prospect, sector type and equity need were employed to explain 
corporate web-based IR practices (Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Craven and Marston, 1999; Marston, 2003; Ettredge et 
al., 2002; Marston and Polei, 2004; Bonson and Escobar, 2006; Bollen et al., 2006; Geerings et. al., 2003; 
Debreceny et al., 2002; Xiao et al., 2004). 
Recently, explanatory studies witnessed the inclusion of new explanatory variables reflecting corporate 
governance mechanisms. Again, the influence of the agency theory is clear in these studies. Stemming from an 
information asymmetry notion, adopting strong corporate governance mechanisms could promote more 
transparent disclosures to mitigate information asymmetry consequences (Kelton and Yang, 2008: 63). It was 
assumed in these studies that companies with strong corporate governance will not only rely on traditional 
methods of voluntary disclosure (paper-based annual reports), but they will also consider new channels of 
voluntary disclosure. Accordingly, online reporting is considered as a tool for improving disclosure transparency 
(Kelton and Yang, 2008).  
In this regard, studies conducted by Abdelsalam and Street (2007), Abdelsalam et al. (2007), Kelton and Yang 
(2008), and Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008) investigated the impact of a number of corporate governance 
characteristics (namely; board independence, role duality, board experience, number of shareholders, number of 
major shareholders, proportion of BLOCK shareholders) on levels of Internet Financial Reporting (IFR). 
Consistent results were reported regarding the association between corporate governance variables and the extent 
of IFR. For example, in the UK Abdelsalam et al. (2007) found a significant positive relationship between levels 
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of IFR and directors’ independence, and a significant negative relationship with directors’ ownership. Similar 
results were reported in the USA, where Kelton and Yang (2008) found significant positive relationships 
between levels of IFR and: Governance index, proportion of independent directors, audit committee expertise, 
audit committee meetings. In Addition, a significant negative relationship was reported regarding the Proportion 
of shares held by Block holders. In Ireland, Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008) found that board independence and 
ownership structure (CEO’s ownership) are positively associated with the timeliness of corporate internet 
reporting. In the context of Egypt, Ezat and El-Masry (2008) examined the impact of corporate governance on 
the timeliness of corporate internet reporting of 37 Egyptian listed companies. A disclosure index was developed 
to measure the timeliness of corporate internet reporting. Independent variables examined were size, type of 
industry, liquidity, ownership structure, board composition, and board size. Results showed that size, sector, and 
liquidity were positively significant with internet reporting. Furthermore, significant positive relationships were 
found for variables related to board independence, board size, and free floats.     
 
4. Hypotheses development 
The primary objective of this paper is to investigate whether corporate governance mechanisms are associated 
with a firm’s Internet financial reporting behavior. Corporate governance mechanisms are involved in 
monitoring and determining a firm’s overall information disclosure policy (Kelton and Yang, 2008). Variables 
used in the current study to depict corporate governance mechanisms are: shares ownership structure 
(Government ownership and Institutional ownership), Board independence and Audit Committee financial 
expertise.  
The following represents a discussion regarding hypotheses development related to these variables. 
4.1 Ownership Structure (Government Ownership) 
Stemming from an institutional theory perspective, coercive isomorphism mechanism that results from formal 
and informal pressures exerted on organizations may affect a company’s decision toward accepting and adopting 
new practices. In recent years, the UAE government carried out a number of initiatives with the ultimate goal of 
encouraging UAE individuals and institutions to enter the information and communication technology (ICT) era. 
This increased importance given by the UAE government toward accepting and implementing ICT make it 
interesting to find out how UAE companies are responding for these initiatives. As for studies conducted in IFR, 
Abu Ghazaleh et al. (2012), Xiao et al. (2004) expected a positive relationship between this variable and 
companies’ engagement in IFR.  
From a voluntary disclosure perspective, Suwaidan (1997) argued that companies with high level of 
governmental ownership are perceived as role model for other companies and as a result increase their voluntary 
disclosure practices. Moreover, Eng and Mak (2003) argue that governmental ownership increases moral hazard 
and agency problems and disclosure is used to mitigate these problems. 
H1: the proportion of shares held by governmental agencies is positively related to the extent company’s Web-
Based IR Disclosures. 
4.2 Ownership Structure (Institutional Ownership) 
Normative isomorphism mechanism of the institutional theory suggests that Professionalism pressures might be 
affecting companies’ decisions toward adopting new practices. In this regard, the existence of institutional 
shareholders in a company’s ownership structure may play a normative pressure on a company to accept and 
engage in information and communication technologies. Considering that the choice of disclosing IR 
information on corporate websites is a voluntary choice of channel of distribution. In addition, institutional 
investors are highly associated with companies’ voluntary disclosure practices (El-Gazzar, 1998; and Bushee and 
Noe, 2000). Moreover, Craven and Marston (1997) argued that if management feel the need to attract and retain 
institutional investment in their company shares they will gladly incur the costs of executing an IR program. 
Also, Suwaidan (1997:117) argued that institutional shareholders are believed to be more sophisticated group of 
users of company’s information than individual shareholders and ,thus, it is expected that a positive relationship 
to exist between the proportion of institutional shareholders in a company’s ownership structure and the level of 
voluntary disclosure. 
Moreover, institutional pressures might be practiced on companies if their major shareholders structure consists 
of prestigious institutions. In this regard a company’s disclosure practice as well as technological adoption 
decisions might be a copy of the practices of its major shareholders, especially institutions.  
Based on this it might be predicted that the level of corporate IFR is positively related to the level of institutional 
ownership in the company’s shares (Ashbaugh et al., 1999; and Bollen et al., 2006). 
H2: the proportion of shares held by institutional investors is positively related to the extent of company’s Web-
Based IR Disclosures.  
4.3 Board Independence 
Board independence is an important element in monitoring the corporate financial accounting process (Klein, 
2002) and affecting the reliability of financial reports (Anderson et al., 2004). A high percentage of independent 
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directors on the board enhances the monitoring of managerial opportunism and reduces management’s chance of 
withholding information. Empirical evidence suggests a positive association between corporate disclosure and 
board independence. Beasley (1996) finds that the proportion of independent directors on the board is positively 
related to the board’s ability to influence disclosure decisions. Chen and Jaggi (2000) find evidence of a positive 
relation between the proportion of independent directors and the comprehensiveness of corporate disclosure in 
the Hong Kong context. Based on findings from the largest 300 Chinese companies, Xiao et al. (2004) suggest 
that IFR format and disclosure of information not required by the China Securities Regulatory Commission are 
positively associated with the proportion of independent directors. Ajinkya et al. (2005) provide evidence on the 
relation between board independence and voluntary disclosure. They find that firms with a greater percentage of 
outside directors are more likely to issue earnings forecasts (proxy for voluntary disclosure) and to make more 
frequent forecast disclosures and conclude that ‘‘monitoring mechanisms are related to the extent and quality of 
discretionary information a manager discloses” (p. 371). In contrast to the above findings, Eng and Mak (2003) 
find that increased presence of outside directors is associated with reduced disclosure using a sample of 
Singapore firms. Gul and Leung (2004) also report a negative association between independent directors and 
voluntary disclosures using a sample of Hong Kong companies. These findings suggest that independent 
directors play a substitute-monitoring role leading to a decrease in the demand for additional disclosure. Overall, 
prior research provides mixed evidence on the link between the financial reporting process, including the level of 
disclosure, and the independence of the board of directors. Accordingly, we test the following hypothesis stated 
in null form: 
H3: There is no association between the level of a firm’s Web-based IR disclosure and the proportion of 
independent directors on the board. 
4.4 Audit Committee Expertise 
The role of the audit committee in corporate governance is a subject of increasing regulatory interest. Prior 
research has shown that key audit committee characteristics – rather than the mere presence of an audit 
committee – critically impact the audit committee’s ability to effectively execute its duties (Abbott et al., 2003; 
Carcello and Neal, 2003).  
Empirical evidence suggests that audit committee financial expertise has a positive effect on financial reporting 
quality. For example, the financial and governance expertise of audit committee members is found to be 
negatively associated with aggressive earnings management (Be´dard et al., 2004) and the occurrence of 
restatement (Abbott et al., 2004) and positively associated with perceived financial reporting quality (Felo et al., 
2003). These results indicate that financial expertise on the audit committee affects financial disclosure. This 
study extends this notion and suggests that audit committee financial expertise is associated with disclosure 
transparency, measured by web-based investor relations practices. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is 
developed: 
H4: The level of a firm’s Web-based IR disclosure is positively associated with its audit committee financial 
expertise. 
 
5.  Methodology of the Study 
The paper draws a sample of 57 corporations listed on the Abu Dubai securities market. To test the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate web-based investor relations disclosures, two methods 
were conducted: the first consist of visiting the websites of listed companies and to perform a content analysis to 
assess the disclosure of certain items related to investor relations information. The second method of collecting 
data is related to collecting the data of corporate governance variables and company’s specific characteristics. 
With this regard, data were extracted from company’s annual reports for the year 2013.   
5.1 The regression Model 
Based on the hypotheses development discussion, the following model is adopted to assess the relationship 
between corporate web-based investor relations disclosures and corporate governance mechanisms: 
WEB-IR = α + β1 (GOV) + β2 (INST) + β3 (Bind) + β4 (AudCm) + β5 (Size) + β6 (Prof) + β7 (GRTH) + β8 
(AGE) + εit 
Where: 
Web-IR = Web-Based Investor relations disclosures index 
GOV = percentage of Government ownership in company’s outstanding shares 
INST = percentage of institutional ownership in company’s outstanding shares 
Bind = board independence, percentage of independent directors of the board of directors 
AudCm = Audit committee expertise, percentage of members in the audit committee with financial expertise or 
background. 
Size = size of the company, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets 
Prof = profitability of the company, measured as return on equity 
GRTH = Growth prospects of the company measured as the ratio of market value to book value of equity. 
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AGE = Number of years since establishment. 
5.2 The dependent variable: corporate web-based Investor relations disclosures 
The study takes a snapshot in 30, January 2014 to investigate the web sites of the sampled companies. The 
WEB-IR was measured by designing a checklist that contains 10 items. Each company was examined and takes 
one if one of the timeliness items was found on its web site or takes 0 if any of the timeliness items was not 
found on its web site or if the company did not have web site. Following Kelton and Yang (2008), Ezat and El-
Masry (2008), Barac (2004), and Pirchegger and Wagenhofer (1999), the following elements are used to build up 
the WEB-IR index: 
- General information about the company 
- Current press releases or news; 
- Current share price; 
- Information about Board of Directors 
- Calendar for future financial events; 
- Availability of latest financial statements or annual reports; 
- Information about company’s social responsibility activities; 
- Information about corporate governance committees 
- Video Broad cast of latest Annual General Meeting; and 
- Option to register for future e-mail alerts regarding press releases or newsletters. 
 
6. Data analysis and Results 
6.1 descriptive statistics 
Table (1) shows the results of the content analysis of companies’ websites. As it can be seen in the table, all 
companies included in the study have a corporate website. The existence of IR information in these websites 
ranges from as low as 11% to a maximum of 100%. The most disclosed IR item is related to the disclosure of 
general information about the company where all websites disclosed this piece of information. On the other hand, 
the least disclosed item is the broadcast of video files related to the company’s annual general meeting (AGM) 
where only 16% of websites used this option. Nevertheless, the use of corporate websites to disclose IR activities 
is relatively acceptable when considering that more than 50% of companies with websites are disclosing IR 
information.   
Item Frequency % 
General information about the company 57 100 
Current press releases or news 47 82 
Current share price 25 44 
Information about Board of Directors 36 63 
Calendar for future financial events 25 44 
Availability of latest financial statements or annual reports 34 60 
Information about company’s social responsibility activities 28 49 
Information about corporate governance committees 27 47 
Video Broadcasting  of latest Annual General Meeting 6 11 
Option to register for future e-mail alerts regarding press releases or newsletters 44 77 
Table (1) 
Web-IR descriptive Statistics 
Also, table (2) provided below shows some descriptive statistics of the variables included in the study. As it can 
be seen in the table, the lowest score for the variable WEB-IR is 20% indicating that this website only disclosed 
2 items related to IR activities. On the other hand, the highest score of WEB-IR reached 90% indicating a 
disclosure of 9 IR related items. 
 Mean Min Max 
WEB-IR 0.35 0.20 0.90 
GOV 0.0472 0.000 0.912 
INST 0.302 0.000 0.998 
BINDP 0.215 0.124 0.642 
AudCm 0.45 0.231 0.751 
Size 16.52 13.83 20.58 
Prof 0.029 -0.586 0.439 
Growth 13.15 1.782 24.32 
Age 21.22 1 44 
Table (2) 
Descriptive statistics of variables 
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6.2 results of the multivariate regression analysis 
Multivariate OLS regression analysis is conducted to find the relationship between the dependent variable 
(WEB-IR) and the independent variables (GOV, INST, BIND, and AudCm). Also, the multivariate regression 
analysis included Size, Profitability, Growth, and Age to control the relationship between the dependent variable 
and the independent variables. Results of the multivariate regression analysis are presented in table (3). 
As it is seen in the table, the overall model is significant with F Statistics score of 17.445 significant at the 0.000 
level (p<0.001). And consistent with prior research, the model’s explanatory power is reasonable at an adjusted 
R square of 0.307.  
Coefficients of the independent variables are all positive, indicating a positive relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and corporate web-based IR activities. However, Board independence is found to be 
insignificant in affecting the level of WEB-IR. Government Ownership (GOV) is found to be significant at the 
0.000 level indicating that companies with high levels of government ownership are highly involved in WEB-IR 
activities. This result provides evidence supporting H1 and consistent with the results reported by AbuGhazaleh 
et al. (2012) and Xiao et al. (2004). Also, Institutional ownership (INST) showed a significant positive 
relationship with WEB-IR activities at the 0.10 significance level. Thus, H2 is supported consistent with 
AbuGhazaleh (2012), Bollen (2006), and Ashbaugh et al. (1999). Moreover, audit committee expertise is found 
to have a significant positive relationship (p<0.05) with WEB-IR supporting evidence of H4 and consistent with 
Kelton and Yang (2008), Be’dard et al. (2004), and Felo et al. (2003). 
As for the control variables, only size and profitability were found to have significant positive relationship with 
WIB-IR activities (p<0.10 and p<0.001 respectively. 
 
F Statistics 17.445  
 
VIF 
P value 0.000 
Adjusted R 0.307 
DW  1.938 
Independent Variables  Coefficient P-Value 
GOV 0.346 0.000*** 1.25 
INST 0.118 0.076* 1.19 
BINDP 0.188 0.124 1.21 
AudCm 0.243 0.032** 1.36 
Size 0.104 0.078* 1.29 
Prof 0.508 0.000*** 1.07 
Growth 0.030 0.213 1.13 
Age 0.014 0.814 1.32 
*significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level 
Table 3 
Results of the OLS regression 
 
7. conclusion and recommendations for future research  
In this study, the relationship between corporate governance and corporate web-based investor relations 
activities is examined in the UAE context. Results showed a significant positive relationship between Ownership 
structure (Government and Institutional) and Audit committee financial expertise and the degree to which 
companies disclose IR information on their websites. This indicates that strong corporate governance 
mechanisms are influencing and motivating companies to enhance and improve their disclosure activities by 
using a new medium (i.e. the internet) and therefore increasing the transparency and information availability to 
the stock market participants in emerging economies such as the UAE.  
It is recommended for future research to assess in depth the status of corporate governance practices of UAE 
companies. Also, the current study suggests carrying out an investigation regarding the influence of Audit 
committee effectiveness and quality of corporate disclosures. 
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